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Case Digest

The purpose of this Case Digest is to identify and summarize for
the reader recent cases that have less significance than those that
merit an in-depth analysis. Included in the digest are cases that
apply established legal principles without necessarily introducing
new ones.
This digest includes cases reported mainly from December 1973
through March 1974. The cases are grouped into topical categories,
and references are given for further research. It is hoped that attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find that this digest facilitates research in problems involving aspects of transnational law.
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1.

ACT OF STATE

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE APPLIES TO INFORMAL ACTIONS OF FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS IF THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENT

ACTS

WITHIN THE SCOPE

OF HIS AUTHORITY

In 1960, the government of Cuba nationalized five Cuban cigar
companies, which had active accounts with American importers
and set up an agency that continued business with the importers
until 1962. The importers made several payments for shipments,
received before the nationalization, to the agency through New
York collecting banks under the established practice. Plaintiffs,
former owners of the cigar companies, sued the importers to recover these payments. The agency intervened to recover payments
due from the importers for postnationalization shipments. The
importers then counterclaimed under a quasi-contract theory for
return of the payments for prenationalization shipments paid erroneously to the agency. The agency claimed that the owner's accounts receivable were included in the property nationalized in
1960 and that the nationalization was an act of state, which is not
subject to review by an American court. The importers maintained
that their payments in good faith to the New York collecting banks
satisfied their liability to the owners, or, alternatively, that they
should be able to setoff these payments to the agency against the
agency's claim. The court found that since the accounts receivable
of the cigar companies had their situs in the United States, the
nationalization decree was ineffective as to them. Thus the importers were liable to the plaintiffs, despite the prior payments made
to the agency. The court then held that the Cuban government's
refusal to return the importers' prenationalization payments was
an act of state. The proper test to determine whether an act of state
exists is whether the agent acted within the scope of his authority,
not whether the action was a formal governmental decree. Then,
relying on First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972), the court allowed each importer's counterclaim, limited to the amount of the agency's claims against the
importers. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
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2. ADMIRALTY
SIGNIFICANT-RELATIONSHIP-TO-MARITIME-ACTIVITY

TEST USED TO

DETERMINE ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION

Smoke emitted from a shore-based paper mill obstructed navigation and caused a ship to collide with a railroad bridge. Plaintiff,
bareboat charterer of the ship, instituted an exoneration and limitation of liability proceeding and filed a third-party complaint
against the owner of the paper mill, charging that the smoke emitted by the paper mill interfered unreasonably with the vessel's use
of the waterway and constituted a nuisance and an obstruction to
navigation. The owner of the vessel filed a cross-claim against the
mill alleging violation of the Georgia Air Quality Control Act and
federal regulations pertaining to navigation and signals, and alleging that such violations were the proximate cause of the collision.
The paper mill owner's motion to dismiss for lack of admiralty
jurisdiction was sustained by the District Court. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding a substantial
connection between the tort and maritime activities. The fact that
the source of the obstruction had a nonmaritime origin was not
controlling since the obstruction resulted in injury to a vessel then
underway on navigable waters. The court stated that if locality of
the tort were the only maritime connection, admiralty jurisdiction
would be lacking. Relying on the "virtually identical" test of "the
relationship of the wrong to traditional maritime activity," of
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972) and a "substantial connection with maritime activities or
interests," of Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453
F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972), the court further clarified the requirements for the developing substantial maritime connection test for
admiralty tort jurisdiction. In re Motor Ship Pacific Carrier,489
F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1974).
DAMAGES FOR

Loss

OF NAVIGATION RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE PLEASURE

BOATS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER EITHER FEDERAL MARITIME LAW
OR CALIFORNIA LAW WHEN NAVIGATION IS IMPAIRED BY OFF-SHORE OIL

SPILL

The plaintiffs, private pleasure boat owners, sought recovery for
damages to their boats caused by an oil spill from an off-shore well
and for loss of navigation rights while the Santa Barbara Channel
was closed during the subsequent cleanup operations. Plaintiff
Summer, 1974

CASE DIGEST

contended that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 130 et seq., as construed by Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), California law should apply.
Defendant urged the application of federal maritime law, which
would deny recovery to the plaintiffs. The District Court permitted
recovery for physical damage to the vessel but not for the loss of
navigation rights. While affirming the lower court's decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's
contention citing various cases when maritime law has been applied under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act when conflicts
with state law arise. Noting the restrictions on admiralty jurisdiction stated in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249 (1972), the court held that the wrong in this case bears a
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" and
thus satisfies the test set out in that case. The court further rejected the plaintiffs contention that Askew v. American Waterways Operators,Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), permitted the application of state law by distinguishing the ship-to-shore pollution,
which was the nexus of that case, from the shore-to-ship pollution
under consideration here. Finally, the court concluded that even
if state law were applicable, plaintiff would not be able to recover
because the obstruction of the channel was a public nuisance and
the plaintiff had not suffered damages different in kind from the
public as a whole, so as to allow recovery under applicable California nuisance law. This decision restrictively denies the application
of state law to incidents arising out of operations conducted on
fixed off-shore drilling platforms. Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co.,
485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
DAMAGES AWARDABLE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF NON-SEAMEN ON
STATE TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE GOVERNED BY GENERAL MARITIME

LAW
In their wrongful death actions, claimants sought damages for
the fatalities of their wives and children in a barge accident on
state territorial waters. Claimants contended that the language in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), recommending guidance by state wrongful death statutes, implied that
actions involving the deaths of non-seamen within state waters
should be governed by local law and not by maritime law, which
relies on unseaworthiness theories to compensate employees. The
barge line argued that since the state statutes conflict with federal
Vol. 7-No. 3
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law, damage awards should be governed by the Death on the High
Seas Act (DOHSA). Relying on Petition of United States Steel
Corporation,436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970), the District Court held
that, under the doctrine of uniformity, general maritime law and
DOHSA govern the measure of damages. The court found that in
such actions, reference may be made to state statutory provisions
only when the uniformity doctrine is not impinged upon by a local
rule contrary to federal law. In re Complaint of American Commercial Lines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
PACKAGING FOR PROTECTION, WHETHER COMPLETE OR PARTIAL,
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS MAKING THE ITEM A PACKAGE UNDER

COGSA
Consignee and owner brought an action against the vessel, its
owner and operator, a loading stevedore and a marine carpentry
firm for damages during shipment to five circuit breakers mounted
on steel bases, which were unwrapped and fully visible except for
wooden crating covering instrument panels. The defendant contended that its liability, if any, was limited by the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) to 500 dollars per circuit breaker. The
plaintiff moved to strike these defenses on the ground that the
circuit breakers were not "packages" within the Act since the steel
base was a permanent part of the circuit breaker. Relying on
Aluminios Poznelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1968), the court held that the goods were "packages" on two
grounds: (1) the Bill of Lading described the goods as packages and
(2) some packaging in preparation for transportation had been
made to facilitate handling. The court clarified the latter point by
stating that packaging, to the extent that it protects cargo, also
facilitates its handling and that packaging for protection, whether
complete or partial, should be considered as constituing a package
within § 4(5) of COGSA. This decision is a further development
of what constitutes a "package" under COGSA. CompanhiaHidro
Electrica v. S/S Loide Honduras, 368 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
A MARITIME

LIEN CREATED UNDER UNITED STATES LAW IS ENFORCEABLE IN CANADA AND TAKES PRIORITY OVER A MORTGAGE ON THE SHIP

Appellant shipyard performed necessary repairs on the defendant ship in New York, thus creating a valid maritime lien under
United States law. Upon default of a mortgage held by the responSummer, 1974
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dent, the ship was ordered to proceed to Vancouver, Canada,
where she was arrested and purchased by respondent mortgagee,
who paid the proceeds into court. In a subsequent action in Canada
to settle the priorities among the ship's creditors, appellant intervened and claimed the priority status that Canadian law affords a
maritime lienholder over a ship's mortgagee. The appellant argued
that although Canadian law does not give the supplier of necessary
repairs a maritime lien, the court should apply United States law,
which does grant the supplier of necessaries a maritime lien-a
right in rem unaffected by movement of the ship from port to port.
The lower court reasoned that since Canadian law, which governs
the availability of remedies, does not provide precedence for the
supplier of necessary repairs, appellant's claim was subordinate to
the mortgage. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed,
holding that a Canadian court will give the holder of a valid maritime lien created under foreign law the same priority to which the
holder of a valid Canadian maritime lien is entitled. The court first
referred to The Ship Strandhill v. Walter W. Hodder Co., [1926]
Can. Exch. 226, aff'd, [1926] Can. S. Ct. 680, in which a Canadian
court decided that maritime liens acquired under foreign law will
be recognized and may be enforced by a tribunal having the requisite admiralty jurisdiction. The court then concluded that a valid
foreign maritime lien should be given the same precedence as a
Canadian maritime lien even though it was created under foreign
law in circumstances insufficient to create a lien in Canada. Therefore, a valid maritime lien created under foreign law will take
precedence in Canada over a ship mortgage. Todd Shipyards Corp.
v. Altema Compania Maritina,S.A. [1973] S.C.R.

_

.

3. ALIEN'S RIGHTS
REGULATIONS EXCLUDING RESIDENT ALIENS FROM EMPLOYMENT IN
FEDERAL COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE VIOLATE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF FIFTH AMENDMENT

The United States Civil Service regulations excluded all resident
aliens from employment in the federal competitive civil service,
regardless of the nature of the job. The government argued there
was a compelling governmental interest counterbalancing the dis-

criminatory classification. In determining that the regulations violated the fifth amendment Due Process Clause, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court decision
Vol. 7-No. 3
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in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 643 (1973), which held a New
York statute barring aliens from civil service jobs to be in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Though not strictly controlling, a coextensive equal protection principle implicit in the concept of fifth amendment Due Process provides a similar basis for this holding. Relying on this principle, and extending the Supreme Court finding in Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), that aliens constitute a suspect
classification in a welfare context, the court held that the prohibitive regulations were too broad. The flat prohibition against federal employment of aliens for all jobs fails to meet the compelling
interest test and, in excluding aliens from all civil service jobs, the
regulations sweeps too broadly to satisfy due process. This decision
may have a profound effect on civil service employment practices.
Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (9th Cir. 1974).
4.

AVIATION

MENTAL DISTRESS ATTACHES TO AN AIR CARRIER'S STRICT LIABILITY
FOR BODILY INJURY UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Defendant's airliner made an unscheduled and lengthy landing
in the Jordanian desert after being hijacked by members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Plaintiffs, a married
couple who were passengers on the plane, brought suit for bodily
injuries and mental anguish while on the "detour." Plaintiffs contended that the airline was strictly liable for any bodily injury
occurring during the flight and that mental distress could be attached to the bodily injury claim as a parasitic tort. Another court,
in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport, 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), had ruled that the Montreal Agreement of 1966, as it modified the Warsaw Convention, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3005 (1929), made
airlines strictly liable for bodily injuries resulting from a hijacking,
but the court denied recovery to a plaintiff who had pleaded mental distress alone. Relying on the Husserl decision, the instant
court translated (from French) article 17 to read that the carrier
is liable "for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger . . . ." Next, the court held that "mental anguish directly
resulting from a bodily injury is damage sustained in the event of
a bodily injury." Therefore, the plaintiffs could recover for any
emotional anxiety suffered as a consequence of the hijacking.
Summer, 1974
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Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D. New
Mex. 1973).
5.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION

CONGRESS MAY GRANT CITIZENSHIP TO FOREIGN-BORN CHILDREN OF
CITIZEN FATHERS, WHILE DENYING SAME TO OFFSPRING OF CITIZEN

MOTHERS

Petitioner, son of an American citizen mother, appealed a deportation order of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The
Service had denied his claim of American citizenship, relying on
section 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, effective at the time
of petitioner's birth, which granted citizenship to foreign-born children of American citizen fathers, but failed to accord a similar
privilege to foreign-born children whose mothers were American
citizens. Petitioner argued that the statutory distinction between
the citizen status of offspring of citizen fathers and the citizen
status of similarly situated offspring of citizen mothers constituted
an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Petitioner relied on Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), contending
that congressional standards are subject to a test of being "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful." Relying on Hein v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 456 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.
1972), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's contention, and held that the legislative preference accorded to offspring of American citizen fathers does not constitute
invidious discrimination. The court distinguished Bellei on the
ground that the test established therein applies only to the power
to subject previously granted citizenship to a condition subsequent, rather than a condition precedent to the initial attainment
of citizenship. Petitioner also contended that his deportation order
was invalid because he was not represented by an attorney at his
hearing before the Special Inquiry Officer. The court rejected this
claim, reasoning that the operative facts of the case were undisputed and that appointment of an attorney was unnecessary. The
significance of this decision is limited to cases involving similar
petitioners born before December 24, 1952. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(7). Villanueva-Jurado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 482 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1973).
CONCEALED INTENTION TO STAY PERMANENTLY IN UNITED STATES DOES

Vol. 7-No. 3

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

NOT CONSTITUTE FRAUD FOR PURPOSES OF INVOKING THE EXCLUSION

PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

Plaintiff, a Belgian citizen and mother of a child of United
States citizenship, refused to leave the United States after her six
month visitor's visa expired and an order was entered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that she be deported. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiff contended
that she originally obtained her visa as the result of fraud and
misrepresentation, by concealing her intent not to leave at the end
of six months. The plaintiff further contended that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (which excludes from
deportation an alien, otherwise admissible at the time of entry,
who is the parent of an United States citizen, and has sought or
procured a visa or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation) precluded her deportation. Relying on two earlier
Ninth and Seventh Circuit decisions, Lourdes Cabuco-Flores v.
Immigration and NaturalizationService, 477 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.
1973) and Milande v. Immigrationand NaturalizationService, 484
F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1973), the court ruled that 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)
operates as a waiver of a deportation charge, if, and only if, the
deportation charge "results directly from the misrepresentation."
Since the deportation order here did not depend directly or indirectly upon the asserted misrepresentation in obtaining the visa,
the court concluded the order must be affirmed. Preux v. Immigration and NaturalizationService, 484 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973).
ALIEN RESIDENT OF UNITED STATES MAY BE NATURALIZED UNDER

§

329(A) OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT EVEN THOUGH NOT

MEETING STRICT MILITARY SERVICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT

The alien petitioner, a resident of the United States for 21 years

under an erroneously issued certificate of citizenship who had been
on active duty in the Army from 1958 to 1960 and in the reserves
from 1960 to 1964, petitioned for naturalization under section
329(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1440.
Section 329(a) provides that any nonresident alien serving on active duty in the United States armed forces between June 25, 1950,
and July 1, 1955, or from February 28, 1961, to the termination
date of the Vietnam hostilities as set by the President may be
naturalized under this section. Though not falling within the strict

military service requirements of this section, the petitioner
claimed eligibility on two theories: (1) he was on active duty in
Summer, 1974
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Korea, which was an area of actual hostility, and the dates of the
Korean War are set out in section 329(a), and (2) the period of his
duty in the reserves was also within the time requirements of section 329(a). The District Court for New Jersey held for the alien
on both of his theories, reasoning that the inclusion of the dates of
the Korean War in the section would indicate that persons serving
in this area be benefited also. In addition, the court noted that the
alien's reserve service, which followed two years of active duty,
evidenced his willingness to serve the United States and should be
counted in determining eligibility under the act. The court distinguished the recent Supreme Court decision in United States Immigration & NaturalizationService v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) on the
basis of Hibi's inability to meet the requirement of United States
residence, whereas the present petitioner had been a resident for
21 years. This decision uses a more liberal standard than the one
used by the Supreme Court and may reflect a more lenient trend
in naturalization decisions in the lower federal courts. Petitionfor
Naturalization of Yui-Nam Donn, 42 U.S.L.W. 2293 (N.J.D.C.
1973).
6.

JURISDICTION

FOREIGN CORPORATION SUBJECT TO STATE LONG ARM JURISDICTION
WHEN ALL CLAIMS WERE OCCASIONED BY THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION

Plaintiff, a citizen of the State of Michigan, brought a suit in
United States District Court seeking damages for personal injuries
suffered while operating a machine manufactured by defendant
Metalmeccanica, an Italian corporation, and imported into the
United States by two Canadian firms. Plaintiff's action was based
on the broad Michigan long arm statute for tort claims, and alleged
three theories for recovery: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied
warranty; and (3) breach of express warranty. Metalmeccanica
moved to dismiss the action contending that, due to insufficient
contacts with Michigan, no in personam jurisdiction could be exercised pursuant to Rule 4(d) (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that the defendant had insufficient
contacts within Michigan to constitute carrying on general business within the state and that Michigan's long arm statute did not
provide a basis for jurisdiction over the breach of express warranty
claim alone. It then held that jurisdiction could be exercised over
all three claims since the negligence and breach of implied warVol. 7-No. 3
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ranty claims specifically fell within the provisions of the statute

and since all three claims were occasioned by the same transaction.
The court reasoned that when claims are sufficiently related to
come within the ancillary jurisdiction concept, it should compel
the defendant to respond to all claims, thus providing a reasonable
forum for economical and expeditious disposition of the claims.
Behlke v. Metalmeccanica Plast, S.P.A., 365 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.
Mich. 1973).
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934,

SECTION 10(B)(5) APPLIES

To

FOREIGN SECURITIES TRANSFER BETWEEN FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
HAVING SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON AMERICAN SECURITIES MARKETS

Defendant, a United States corporation, and plaintiff, its European subsidiary, signed a memorandum of understanding whereby
key employees of defendant would form a Dutch corporation and
purchase the subsidiary from defendant and that inter alia the
United States corporation would receive all retained earnings of
the subsidiary prior to a fixed date. Defendant sued plaintiff in
Europe over the amount of retained earnings and attempted to
reacquire the subsidiary. In the United States, the subsidiary sued
the United States corporate defendant on various counts of
breaches of trust, breaches of contract, unfair trade practices, and
fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of securities in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970). Defendant moved to dismiss the counts arising under the
Act for want of subject matter jurisdiction and to dismiss or stay
the remaining counts pending final adjudication of the Netherlands litigation. Defendant contended that the Act does not apply
to a transfer of ownership of securities of a foreign corporation to
a foreign purchaser that took place outside the United States. The
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied defendant's motions. The court first stated that although other litigation might establish defendant's right to reacquire plaintiff, it
would not establish whether such reacquisition would foreclose
plaintiff's suit. The court also concluded that it has subject matter
jurisdiction under § 10(b)(5) in light of evidence of significant
impact on the United States securities market since defendant was
United States owned and its stock was registered on the American
Stock Exchange, one of plaintiff's major stockholders was a United
States citizen, and the sale and alleged fraud occurred in the
United States. The court would not rule whether § 10(b)(5) proSummer, 1974
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tects only a United States investor nor did it reach the issue of
misrepresentation. Selas of America (Nederland) v. Selas Corpora-

tion of America, 365 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
7.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

ACT

HELD NOT TO APPLY TO STATE DE-

PARTMENT DECISION TO RECOGNIZE AND ALLOW CLAIM OF FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

During the violence surrounding the military overthrow of the
Allende government in Chile, the Cuba M/VPlaya Larga abruptly
left Valparaiso harbor, without completely unloading its cargo of
raw sugar and without removing four unloading cranes owned by
a Chilian corporation. A second Cuban vessel, the MIV Marble
Island, also carrying sugar, changed course before reaching Chile.
The Chilian consignee of the sugar aboard both vessels instituted
a breach of contract suit in the Panama Canal Zone District Court
against the Cuban corporation that owned the vessels. The jurisdiction of the court was based on a writ of attachment against a
vessel that was present in the Canal Zone and owned by the Cuban
corporation. The State Department suggested that sovereign immunity barred the suit, and plaintiffs requested both a statement
of reasons for the decision and an opportunity to appeal. The State
Department denied both requests. The court then granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit, but deferred the entry of the
order pending appeal. Plaintiffs, on appeal, argued that the State
Department decision to allow a claim of foreign sovereign immunity was "final agency action" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act and was, therefore, subject to judicial review. Acknowledging that the question presented was one of first
impression, the court held that the APA does not apply to a State
Department decision to recognize and allow a claim of foreign
sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that the separation of
powers requires the judicial branch to assume that the State Department has taken into account all pertinent considerations in
arriving at its decision, and that the disclosure of the reasons behind the decision might itself defeat the legitimate foreign policy
objectives of the executive branch. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1974).
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